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 The Journalist-Source Privilege in 
Quebec Civil Law: Globe and Mail v. 
Canada (Attorney General) 
Christian Leblanc, Marc-André Nadon and  
Émilie Forgues-Bundock∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Investigative journalism plays an important role in the preservation 
of democracy. In fact, the press has often been regarded and referred to 
as the “watchdog of democracy”. Behind reporters there are often 
anonymous sources, people who are not authorized to disclose certain 
information or documents to the press. History has shown that, in many 
cases, these sources are essential to the uncovering and reporting of 
matters of public interest such as the Watergate scandal during the 1970s 
and the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985.1  
More recently in Quebec, investigative journalism has brought to 
light flaws in municipal governments as well as questionable practices in 
the construction industry. Leading this wave of reports, the affair best 
known as the “Sponsorship Scandal” rocked the political and media 
landscape in Canada and confirmed the importance of investigative 
journalism in a free and democratic society. The leaking of confidential 
information to a reporter by anonymous sources had prompted then 
Prime Minister Paul Martin to order a public inquiry into the Sponsor-
ship Program set up by the federal cabinet following the 1995 referen-
dum on Quebec’s sovereignty. 
It is in this context that the Supreme Court of Canada has examined 
the journalist-source privilege in Quebec civil law. In Globe and Mail v. 
                                                                                                             
∗  Christian Leblanc is a partner at Fasken Martineau; Marc-André Nadon is a lawyer at 
Fasken Martineau; Émilie Forgues-Bundock is a law student at Fasken Martineau. 
1  Gesca ltée c. Groupe Polygone Éditeurs inc. (Malcom Média inc.), [2009] J.Q. no 8151, 
2009 QCCA 1534, at para. 86 (Que. C.A.); see also R. v. National Post, [2004] O.J. No. 178, 69 
O.R. (3d) 427, at para. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.); quashed, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.) 
(but not on this point) for other examples of journalistic reporting based on confidential sources. 
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Canada (Attorney General),2 the country’s highest court confirmed the 
mixed (civil law and common law) nature of Quebec’s civil procedure 
and evidence law and established an analytical framework to determine 
in which circumstances a journalist-source privilege will be recognized, 
reaffirming at the same time the essential role played by the media in the 
preservation of democracy. 
This article analyzes the recognition of the journalist-source privi-
lege in Quebec. Most jurisdictions offer some protection to journalist-
source relationships; however, not all of them implemented the same 
model of protection. In order to better understand the context of this 
recognition, we begin with an overview of the law in a few foreign 
jurisdictions. Such an exercise gives us an opportunity to better situate 
the protection Canadian journalists now enjoy under the Court’s decision 
in Globe and Mail. 
The complexity of this makes it unique and therefore worth looking 
at in more depth. The first difficulty that the Supreme Court of Canada 
faced was its own refusal to recognize a constitutionally entrenched 
privilege in National Post a few months ago. The second hurdle for the 
Supreme Court of Canada was the absence of a specific statutory 
provision that could incorporate a journalist-source privilege in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 or the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms.4 The last and not least challenge for the 
Supreme Court of Canada was to reconcile the common law with the 
interpretation of the Civil Code of Quebec5 in order to apply a common 
law doctrine to Quebec civil cases. 
In order to present a more in-depth analysis, this article will not deal 
with the validity of the publication ban, which was nonetheless a very 
important issue in this case. This article does not provide an exhaustive 
list of the circumstances that could require a journalist to disclose the 
identity of his or her source. Its purpose is to present the law in Quebec 
on the recognition of the journalist-source privilege in a civil case, as 
clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Globe and Mail. 
                                                                                                             
2  [2010] S.C.J. No. 41, 2010 SCC 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Globe 
and Mail”]. 
3  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Canadian Charter”]. 
4  R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”]. 
5  S.Q. 1991, c. 64 [hereinafter “Civil Code”]. 
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II. FOREIGN LAW 
Most jurisdictions offer some protection to journalist-source relation-
ships; however, not all of them implemented the same model of protec-
tion. Among the available models, we selected examples that show the 
three main trends, namely: (1) a constitutionally entrenched privilege 
(Europe and the United Kingdom); (2) a specific statutory protection 
(American states, the United Kingdom and Australia to a certain extent); 
and (3) an implicit protection derived from the common law (as used to 
be the case in Australia). 
1. European Union 
Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms recognizes the journalist-source privilege: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.6 
Any order forcing a reporter to reveal the identity of a source in connec-
tion with a legal proceeding is prima facie a breach of a fundamental 
right. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights held that the journalist-source privilege outweighed a company’s 
interests in protecting confidential information related to the preparation 
of its financial statements.7 In November 1989, Tetra Ltd. was experienc-
ing serious financial problems due to major losses which, some believed, 
                                                                                                             
6  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (November 
4, 1950), 213 R.T.N.U. 221, S.T.E. 5, art. 10 [hereinafter “European Human Rights Convention”]. 
7  Goodwin v. United Kingdom (1996), 22 E.H.H.R. 123 [hereinafter “Goodwin”]. See also 
Ernst v. Belgium (2004), 39 E.H.R.R. 35.  
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could have been avoided. The company was about to take out a loan to 
offset a loss when confidential documents describing the situation were 
stolen and then given to a reporter from The Engineer magazine. In-
formed of the leak of information and the theft of the documents, Tetra 
Ltd. applied for and obtained an injunction to prevent publication of the 
article and any information related to the stolen confidential documents. 
In resolving this matter, the European Court of Human Rights re-
viewed the applicable analytical framework to determine whether the 
setting aside of the journalist-source privilege is justified in a specific 
case. Referring to article 10(2) of the European Human Rights Conven-
tion, the Court noted that it was in the interest of a free and democratic 
society that freedom of the press be protected.8 To do so, a balance 
between competing interests must be sought, namely, those of Tetra Ltd. 
to prevent the damage it could incur due to the loss of investors’ confi-
dence and to seek legal action against the person who leaked the confi-
dential documents, and those of a free and democratic society in securing 
a free press.9 The Court held that, although the goal of the order was 
laudable, compelling the reporter to disclose the identity of his source 
was not an appropriate means of achieving it.10 The undermining of 
freedom of the press was too great and it was not necessary to protect 
Tetra’s rights under English law, despite the discretion member States 
enjoy in applying the European Human Rights Convention in their 
jurisdiction.11 
2. United Kingdom 
As a party to the European Human Rights Convention, the United 
Kingdom recognizes the existence of a journalist-source privilege as set 
out in article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention, a principle 
also found in English law in article 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981: 
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of 
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the source of information 
contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be 
established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in 
                                                                                                             
8  Id., at paras. 39-40. 
9  Id., at para. 45. 
10  Id., at para. 46. 
11  Id. 
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the interest of justice or national security or for the prevention of 
disorder or crime.12 
Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates article 10 of the 
European Human Rights Convention word for word.13 Ashworth Security 
Hospital v. MGN Ltd.14 clarified the effect of incorporating this article 
into domestic English law.15 In doing so, the House of Lords reiterated 
the importance of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the 
journalist-source privilege in a free and democratic society.16 According 
to the House of Lords, there is no doubt that this right includes the 
freedom to receive or communicate information or ideas without inter-
ference by public authorities, subject to certain exceptions in particular 
circumstances.17 
The facts of that case stem from the highly publicized story of the 
serial killer Ian Brady, who was arrested for heinous murders committed 
in the Greater Manchester area in England during the 1960s.18 Mr. Brady 
was declared criminally insane in 1985. Incarcerated, he said several 
times, through the media, that he did not wish to be released but that he 
claimed at least the right to die. He went on a hunger strike. In its 
December 2, 2009 issue, the Daily Mirror published an article that 
contained extracts of Mr. Brady’s medical records when he was detained 
at the Ashworth hospital. In exchange for the sum of £1,500, the Daily 
Mirror had obtained this information from a secret intermediary source, 
who had obtained it from a good source, probably someone working at 
the hospital. In connection with legal proceedings related to Mr. Brady’s 
mental health, the Court ordered the Daily Mirror to testify as to how it 
had obtained the medical file and identify any person who had partici-
pated in collecting the information. The disclosure of the identity of the 
intermediary source by the newspaper would clearly have allowed the 
main source at the establishment to be identified. The Daily Mirror 
therefore objected to the order. 
According to the House of Lords, a privilege for journalists’ sources 
is an essential aspect of freedom of expression and freedom of the press: 
                                                                                                             
12  Contempt of Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 49. 
13  Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42, Schedule 1, Part I, art. 10. 
14  [2002] U.K.H.L. 29 [hereinafter “Ashworth”]. 
15  Id., at paras. 37-40. 
16  Id., at paras. 37-38. 
17 Id., at para. 37. 
18  These killings are commonly referred to as the “Moors murders”. 
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The fact is that information which should be placed in the public 
domain is frequently made available to the press by individuals who 
would lack the courage to provide the information if they thought there 
was a risk of their identity being disclosed. The fact that journalists’ 
sources can be reasonably confident that their identity will not be 
disclosed makes a significant contribution to the ability of the press to 
perform their role in society of making information available to the 
public. It is for this reason that it is well established now that the courts 
will normally protect journalists’ sources from identification.19 
Accordingly, the House of Lords reiterated the risks of an order forcing a 
reporter to disclose the identity of his or her source, namely it would 
discourage certain sources from confiding in reporters and thus jeopard-
ize to a certain extent freedom of expression, freedom of the press and 
the public’s right to information.20 However, the House of Lords recog-
nized that the journalist-source privilege cannot be absolute, and that 
circumstances may, according to the context, justify the disclosure of the 
identity of a confidential source.21 In the Ashworth case, their lordships 
were of the view that an order of disclosure was necessary, proportionate 
and justified. The care of patients in this particular situation was already 
a challenge and was aggravated by the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation.22 The “pressing social need” in this case was to preserve the 
confidentiality of patients’ notes and records, thus guaranteeing the 
relationship of fundamental trust between therapists and patients.23 
In conclusion, in the United Kingdom, there is a journalistic privi-
lege recognized as a corollary of freedom of expression, which may 
nonetheless be set aside in certain circumstances following an analysis 
which takes into account particular circumstances of each situation. 
3. United States 
No provision of the U.S. Constitution recognizes a journalist-source 
privilege that would prevent a reporter from being compelled to disclose 
the identity of a secret source. However, the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                             
19  Ashworth, supra, note 14, at para. 61. 
20  This is what the courts generally refer to as the “chilling effect”. 
21  Supra, note 14, at para. 61. 
22  Id., at para. 63. 
23  Id., at paras. 62-63. 
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Court considered recognizing a journalist-source privilege under the U.S. 
Constitution in connection with a criminal trial in Branzburg v. Hayes.24 
Branzburg v. Hayes dealt with the publication of two articles in the 
Courier-Journal. On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal published 
an article by Paul Branzburg in which the reporter described in great 
detail a scene he had witnessed himself, the manufacturing of hashish 
from marijuana by two residents of Jefferson County. The article was 
accompanied by a photograph showing a pair of hands holding the illegal 
substance. According to the article, the two protagonists earned approxi-
mately $5,000 in three weeks from this business. It also said that the 
reporter had promised to maintain the anonymity of the people he met for 
the purpose of the article. The second article, published on January 10, 
1971, was a summary of the reporter’s observations during the two 
weeks he had spent visiting drug addicts in Kentucky. The reporter was 
called to testify before the Jefferson County grand jury, which was set up 
to discover who had committed the crimes he had reported about. The 
reporter refused to identify those associated directly or indirectly with his 
articles under the First Amendment, which explicitly guarantees freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press.25 
The Court refused to recognize a First Amendment privilege that 
would allow a reporter to refuse to answer a question that could identify 
a secret source, unless the legal process is tainted by bad faith.26 The 
Court held that the public interest in adjudicating crimes outweighs the 
need for reporters to guarantee the confidentiality of relationships with 
their sources, even when it undermines freedom of the press. The U.S. 
Supreme Court also held that nothing prevents a state legislature from 
fashioning its own standards and rules to deal with the journalist-source 
privilege.27 
Recognizing both the importance of promoting free speech and free-
dom of the press, and that freedom of the press includes the freedom to 
gather information without disruption, 33 American states as well as the 
District of Columbia have enacted “shield laws” setting out a reporter’s 
privilege that protects the relationship between a reporter and his or her 
                                                                                                             
24  408 U.S. 665 (1972) [hereinafter “Branzburg”]. 
25  U.S. Const. Amend. I : “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” 
26  Branzburg, supra, note 24, at 707. 
27  Id., at 706. 
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source and sometimes extends to the very protection of the information 
communicated.28 In 16 other states, the case law recognizes such a 
privilege.29 Only Wyoming has not ruled on this issue so far.30 
4. Australia 
There is no provision enacting a journalist-source privilege in An Act 
to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia.31 Such privilege is, 
however, codified in the Evidence Act 199532 and this codification 
reflects the recognition of a journalist-source privilege by the courts. 
Before the codification of the journalist-source privilege, in The 
Commonwealth of Australia v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.,33 the High 
Court of Australia quashed an injunction aimed at preventing the publica-
tion of a controversial book in which the authors had reproduced extracts 
of confidential government documents concerning the country’s defence 
and foreign policy from 1968 to 1975. The book’s editors had agreed 
with two newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, on the 
publication of a series of articles presenting extracts of the book for 
promotional purposes. The confidential documents examined included, 
among other things, memos, studies and reports about the East Timor 
crisis, the negotiations surrounding the establishment of American bases 
on Australian territory, Australia’s support of the Shah of Iran, security at 
the Butterworth base in Malaysia, information about the British and 
American secret service and the military alliance between Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States (the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty). 
Although the publication of this information represented at first 
glance a risk to the country’s national security, the High Court of Austra-
                                                                                                             
28 U.S., Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Journalists’ Privilege to 
Withhold Information in Judicial and Other Proceedings: State Shield Statutes (Order Code RL32806), 
updated June 27, 2007 (by Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division) [hereinafter 
“CRS Report”]. The 33 states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Washington. See also Kathleen Ann Ruan, Legislative Attorney, Journalists’ Privilege: Overview of the 
Law and Legislation in Recent Congresses (January 19, 2011). 
29  CRS Report, id., at CRS-1 (Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and 
Wisconsin). 
30  CRS Report, id., at CRS-1. 
31  (July 9, 1900) (Cth.). 
32  Evidence Act 1995 (Act No. 2 of 1995), art. 126Aff. 
33  (1980), 147 C.L.R. 39 [herinafter “Australia v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.”]. 
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lia found nothing in the book that would justify restraining freedom of 
the press. Despite the security code in the classification of the docu-
ments, the Court noted that the extracts presented in the book did not 
disclose any information about military techniques or technology or the 
weapons, logistics or organization of the Australian or foreign armed 
forces.34 Accordingly, although the publication of certain extracts could 
be embarrassing for the Australian government and said publication 
might put a damper on diplomatic relations involving the sharing of 
military information or foreign affairs, the country’s national security 
was not jeopardized.35 Also, as copies of the book had already been 
distributed in Indonesia and the United States, an injunction would not 
have prevented the alleged harm in the two countries that were the most 
targeted by the contents of the book and newspaper articles. The Court 
therefore held that restraining freedom of the press was not warranted. 
Now that we have completed our overview, we turn to the issue of 
the protection of journalistic sources in Canada and, more specifically, in 
Quebec.  
III. THE MIXED ORIGINS OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN QUEBEC 
LAW: CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXISTENCE OF A JOURNALIST-
SOURCE PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL CASE 
The origin of the debate surrounding the recognition of the journal-
ist-source privilege in civil law lies in the cultural particularities of 
Quebec law, namely, the mixed nature of its sources. Professor Daniel 
Jutras describes Quebec’s legal culture as follows: 
In Quebec, the political culture of litigation and its economy is 
undeniably North American. Today it fits in somewhat uncomfortably 
between, on the one hand, the culture of legal protagonist, which is 
found in the realm of common law, and, on the other hand, a normative 
culture which affirms that sources of Quebec’s civil procedure are 
associated with the civil law tradition.36 
The issue of whether the common law plays a suppletive role in Quebec 
civil law was at the heart of the debates surrounding the recognition of a 
journalist-source privilege in Quebec. Although article 1206 of the 
                                                                                                             
34  Id., at para. 10. 
35  Id., at paras. 35-37. 
36  Daniel Jutras, “Culture et droit processuel : le cas du Québec” (2009) R.D. McGill 273, at 
278 (translation). 
282 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
former Civil Code of Lower Canada37 explicitly allowed Québec judges, 
in commercial matters, to resort to common law rules and principles of 
evidence when there was otherwise no applicable Quebec provision on 
point, the Civil Code of Quebec did not reproduce this provision or 
anything like it.38 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada had previ-
ously held that the Civil Code constitutes in and of itself a set of com-
plete and autonomous rules and that systematically importing common 
law principles should be avoided.39 Thus, since the Civil Code came into 
force, there has been uncertainty as to whether the common law can be 
used to fill a legal void in Quebec civil law. Both the doctrine and 
Quebec courts have examined this issue, without providing a clear 
answer. The case law in recent years shows that courts may be leaning, 
more receptively, to foreign sources. Indeed, the growing influence of 
cross-border sources on civil procedure and evidence law is notable in 
the common law provinces, Quebec and Canada. 
In Wightman v. Widdrington,40 the Quebec Court of Appeal noted the 
common law’s influence on Quebec’s civil procedure, particularly when 
the Code of Civil Procedure41 does not provide a solution to the issue and 
Quebec courts have not ruled on it. Writing for the Court, the Honourable 
Yves-Marie Morissette stated as follows: 
No judgment published in Quebec involves facts similar to those which 
gave rise to the application for disqualification in the Superior Court. It 
is therefore up to the Court to examine Canadian and foreign 
jurisprudence on this issue. Although the jurisprudence from these 
other legal systems should be followed with caution, it is nonetheless 
relevant when the applicable fundamental principles are substantially 
the same as those admitted in Quebec law.42 
What we see from this brief review of case law is essentially what 
the Supreme Court of Canada held in Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 
                                                                                                             
37  1866 (C.C.L.C.). 
38  Globe and Mail, supra, note 2, at para. 41. 
39  Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.J. No. 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 (S.C.C.), where 
LeBel J. held that libel cases should be analyzed and decided based on the Civil Code of Quebec and 
civil liability in conjunction with the Charters, and that the fair comment defence should not be 
applied mechanically in civil law, but aspects of it may be considered in analyzing fault. 
40  Wightman v. Widdrington (Succession de), [2007] J.Q. no 13704, [2008] R.J.Q. 59 (Que. 
C.A.) [hereinafter “Wightman v. Widdrington”]. 
41  Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25 [hereinafter “C.C.P.”]. 
42  Supra, note 40, at para. 58 (translation). 
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2858-0702 Québec Inc.43 regarding the mixed sources of Quebec private 
law. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine 
whether or not there was an implied rule of confidentiality under Quebec 
civil law. After a thorough review of the evolution of the rules relating to 
examinations on discovery in Quebec law, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that, although no provision of the C.C.P. expressly provided for it, 
such a rule: 
may … be found in Quebec procedural law, based on the changes that 
have taken place in the institutions of the civil procedure and on 
privacy principles. The rule of confidentiality, the effects of which are 
analogous to the principles developed by the common law, may be 
recognized in Quebec in accordance with the techniques of civil law 
analysis, based on the fundamental principles around which the civil 
law and judicial procedure are organized.44 
Thus, although it is not always advisable to import a common law rule 
into civil law, common law rules may nonetheless influence the analysis 
of a question to which the C.C.P. does not seem to provide a clear 
answer. Furthermore, we note that, in several respects, the rules of 
Quebec civil procedure and evidence are similar to those of the other 
Canadian provinces as the civil law and common law traditions share 
certain fundamental principles.45 
IV. STRIVING FOR A LEGAL FOUNDATION SUPPORTING  
THE RECOGNITION OF A JOURNALIST-SOURCE PRIVILEGE IN  
QUEBEC CIVIL LAW 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
In the absence of a provision that explicitly recognizes the journalist-
source privilege, we should determine whether the recognition of such a 
privilege can be inferred from other constitutional provisions. 
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter entrenches freedom of expression: 
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
. . . . . 
                                                                                                             
43  [2001] S.C.J. No. 49, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 743, 2001 SCC 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lac 
d’Amiante”]. 
44  Id., at para. 79 (emphasis added). 
45  Id., at paras. 56-61, 78. 
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(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication; … 
 
Significantly, LaForest J. noted in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
v. Lessard that section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter, which recognizes 
freedom of expression and its corollary, freedom of the press, also covers 
the right to gather news without disruption.46 
In R. v. National Post,47 the Supreme Court rejected the position of 
the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association built on the premise that protection of confidential 
sources should be treated as if it were encompassed in the Canadian 
Charter, as a corollary of section 2(b). Drawing an analogy to solicitor-
client privilege, the Supreme Court stated that, even though solicitor-
client privilege is supported by and impressed with the values underlying 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter, it is generally seen as a “fundamental 
and substantive rule of law” rather than as “constitutional”.48 
Referring to one of its recent decisions, the Supreme Court stated 
that freedom of expression is not limited to the traditional media, but is 
enjoyed by “everyone” (using the term in section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter) who chooses to exercise his or her freedom of expression on 
matters of public interest, whether by blogging, tweeting, standing on a 
street corner and shouting the “news”, reporting, or any other means.49 
The Supreme Court found that this group of writers and speakers is too 
heterogeneous to offer constitutional immunity for communications 
between its members and “sources” who are promised confidentiality, 
since such immunity would significantly undermine law enforcement and 
other constitutionally recognized values such as the right to privacy.50 
According to the Supreme Court, it is very possible and desirable to 
provide solid protection from the compelled disclosure of secret source 
identities without recognizing a general constitutional immunity for this 
type of communication.51 
It should be noted that the Court’s decision in R. v. National Post was 
rendered before the decision at the heart of this article. For some, R. v. 
                                                                                                             
46  [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.). 
47  [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, at para. 38 (S.C.C.). 
48  Id., at para. 39; R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at para. 17 
(S.C.C.).  
49   R. v. National Post, id., at para. 40; Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 
3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).  
50  R. v. National Post, id., at para. 40. 
51  Id., at para. 41. 
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National Post predicted how the Court would rule on the issue of the 
privilege of journalists’ sources in the Globe and Mail case. However, it 
is important not to lose sight of the particular legal context of the 
National Post case. There, the Court was concerned with the production 
of documents or other evidence in connection with a criminal investiga-
tion in a common law province. The scope of that case is therefore 
limited and only applies when a reporter has material evidence necessary 
to prove the existence of a crime. In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that a journalist’s refusal to turn over such material evidence on the 
grounds that it could reveal the identity of a confidential source was not 
justified, at least in the case of serious crimes. The Globe and Mail case 
raised a different issue, which was whether a journalist-source privilege 
should be recognized in Quebec civil law in connection with a commer-
cial dispute. 
2. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 
In the absence of a provision in the Quebec Charter that explicitly 
recognizes the journalist-source privilege, it is appropriate to examine the 
scope of other provisions of the Quebec Charter that could give the status 
of quasi-constitutional privilege to the confidentiality of journalistic 
sources in Quebec. 
Section 3 of the Quebec Charter is the equivalent of section 2(b) of 
the Canadian Charter: 
3. Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, 
including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of 
opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and 
freedom of association. 
Given the resemblance between these provisions and the decision in R. v. 
National Post, it would have been difficult for the Court to recognize a 
quasi-constitutional journalist-source privilege in Quebec pursuant to 
section 3 of the Quebec Charter. 
Section 9 of the Quebec Charter protects professional secrecy: 
9. Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential 
information. 
No person bound to professional secrecy by law and no priest or other 
minister of religion may, even in judicial proceedings, disclose 
confidential information revealed to him by reason of his position or 
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profession, unless he is authorized to do so by the person who confided 
such information to him or by an express provision of law. 
The tribunal must, ex officio, ensure that professional secrecy is 
respected. 
According to several authors, professional secrecy only applies to 
professionals who have a statutory duty to respect it, and its application 
is limited to professional bodies governed by the Professional Code,52 
which does not cover the profession of reporter. The legislator had 
considered including the profession of reporter in the list of professional 
bodies governed by the law when the Professional Code was adopted 
but, in the end, the National Assembly rejected this proposal.53 
Contrary to the Canadian Charter, which does not explicitly recog-
nize a right to information, section 44 of the Quebec Charter clearly 
provides that “[e]very person has a right to information to the extent 
provided by law”. However, the Supreme Court stated that the rights set 
out in Chapter IV entitled “Economic and Social Rights”, including 
section 44 of the Quebec Charter: 
are limited in such a way as to put the specific legislative measures or 
framework adopted by the legislature beyond the reach of judicial 
review. These provisions require the state to take steps to make the 
Chapter IV rights effective, but they do not allow for the judicial 
assessment of the adequacy of those steps.54 
Thus, the Quebec Charter recognizes a positive right to information, 
worded in limited terms, the scope of which seems rather restrictive. 
3.  The “Wigmore Doctrine” Applied to the Journalist-Source 
Privilege in R. v. National Post  
Professor John Henry Wigmore, an author highly recognized in 
common law for his doctrine on the law of evidence, developed a 
methodology that would recognize certain relationships as privileged, on 
                                                                                                             
52  R.S.Q., c. C-26, Sch. I. See also Office des professions du Québec, “Ordres profession-
nels”, online: <http://www.opq.gouv.qc.ca/ordres-professionnels> (in French only). See also N. 
Vallières, “Le secret professionnel inscrit dans la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du 
Québec” (1985) 26 C. de D. 1019, at 1022-23. See also Léo Ducharme, L’administration de la 
preuve, 3d ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2001), at 94. 
53  Québec, Journal des débats : Commissions parlementaires, 3d Sess., 30th Leg., No. 6 
(January 22, 1975), at B-322. 
54  Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at 
para. 92 (S.C.C.). 
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a case-by-case basis.55 Although at the time Professor Wigmore was not a 
supporter of a privilege for secret sources, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the existence of a journalist-source privilege by applying the 
“Wigmore Doctrine” to communications between a reporter and his or 
her secret source in R. v. National Post.56 
The origins of R. v. National Post lie in what is better known today 
as “Shawinigate”. The appellant Andrew McIntosh, a journalist at the 
National Post (“National Post”), took an interest in then Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien’s involvement with the Grand-Mère Golf Club located in 
Mr. Chrétien’s home riding of St-Maurice, Québec. A few years later, at 
the National Post, Mr. McIntosh received a sealed plain brown envelope 
that contained a document that appeared to be a copy of a Business 
Development Bank of Canada (“BDBC”) internal loan authorization for 
a $615,000 mortgage to Auberge Grand-Mère. Mr. McIntosh forwarded 
the document to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Prime Minister’s legal 
counsel, and the BDBC to assess their validity. All claimed the document 
was a forgery. Following a complaint from the BDBC, the RCMP met 
with Mr. McIntosh, who declined to identify his source. Mr. McIntosh 
told the RCMP, however, that the document and envelope were kept at 
the National Post. The RCMP applied to the Ontario Court of Justice for 
a warrant and assistance order stating that the evidence it wished to seize 
was not available from any other source. The RCMP intended to submit 
the document and envelope for forensic testing to determine if they 
contained anything that could help to identify the source. Mr. McIntosh 
and the National Post applied to quash the warrant and assistance order. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that, although journalists’ 
sources should receive evidentiary protection in a criminal investigative 
process, the judicial search for truth outweighed the protection of the 
journalist’s source in this case. By extending the application of the 
“Wigmore Doctrine” to that case, the Supreme Court of Canada ac-
knowledged that the role of investigative journalism has expanded over 
the years to help fill what has been described as a democratic deficit in 
the transparency and accountability of our public institutions, and the 
need to respect journalist-source confidentiality in certain specific 
circumstances to ensure the vitality of investigative journalism.57 
                                                                                                             
55  Edward J. Imwinkelried, dir., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence — Evidentiary 
Privileges (Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Aspen Publishers, 2011). 
56  Supra, note 48. 
57  Id., at paras. 54-55. 
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The “Wigmore Doctrine” consists of four elements which the Su-
preme Court of Canada restated in the particular context of journalists’ 
sources as follows: (1) the communication must originate in a confidence 
that the identity of the informant will not be disclosed; (2) the confidence 
must be essential to the relationship in which the communication arises; 
(3) the relationship must be one which should be “sedulously fostered” in 
the public good; and (4) if all of these requirements are met, the court 
must consider whether in the instant case the public interest served by 
protecting the identity of the informant from disclosure outweighs the 
public interest in getting at the truth.58 
In R. v. National Post, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that 
journalist-source protection falls within the grasp of section 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter, which is a conclusion that constitutes a significant 
ruling in and of itself. However, the facts and context of R. v. National 
Post prevents the decision from standing out as a complete precedent on 
the question of journalists’ sources in Canada. R. v. National Post 
involved the production of documents in a criminal investigative process, 
and did not raise any issue about the interaction of the common law and 
civil law. Therefore that decision has limited value as precedent in other 
cases of journalist-source privilege in Canada. As we will see, Globe and 
Mail continued the analysis that began in R. v. National Post. 
(a) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” in Quebec Civil Law:  
A Doctrinal Debate 
Professors Léo Ducharme and Jean-Claude Royer adopted diametri-
cally opposed views of the influence of the common law on Quebec law 
of evidence and civil procedure since the Civil Code came into force. 
Both view differently the effect of the disappearance of the legislative 
provision codifying the suppletive role of common law rules in Quebec 
civil law. 
Professor Ducharme argues that, in the case of a fact which occurred 
after the Civil Code came into force, “the coming into force of the Code 
had the effect of repealing the former French and English laws as 
suppletive law regarding evidence”.59 
                                                                                                             
58  Id., at para. 53. 
59  Léo Ducharme, Précis de la preuve, 5th ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2005), at 17 
(translation). 
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However, according to Professor Royer’s thesis, the legislator’s fail-
ure to include a provision similar to article 1206 of the C.C.L.C. in the 
Civil Code does not change the fact that French law and common law 
remain the foundations of the Civil Code.60 Accordingly, there is nothing 
to prevent the use of common law rules to interpret Quebec civil law. 
Professor Royer adds, regarding the rules concerning investigations and 
testimonial evidence, that 
[m]ost of these rules stem from the common law. As a result, English 
law should generally be used to interpret it. Furthermore, the legislator 
did not adopt a code of civil procedure which includes a complete and 
exhaustive enumeration of all the rules relating to evidence and the 
administration of evidence. This could justify the maintaining of certain 
common law privileges, which are related to the accusatorial and 
contradictory nature of a trial, even if they are not formally recognized 
in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.61 
On the more specific issue of privileges recognized in common law, 
Professor Royer notes that several privileges created by common law 
were introduced into Quebec civil law.62 Still, the courts have sometimes 
refused to use common law rules to make up for a certain deficiency in 
Quebec law, causing the uncertainty to continue. Professor Royer 
believes that the common law will continue to influence the interpreta-
tion of certain rules codified in Quebec law that stem from the common 
law.63 Regarding the issue of whether the common law could be used to 
justify a privilege not explicitly recognized in a legal text, he says “the 
power of the courts to rule outside of written codes and legislation, when 
deficiencies appear, is still much more limited in the civil law tradition 
than in the common law”.64 
(b) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” in Quebec Civil Law:  
a Jurisprudential Debate 
When they have not applied the “Wigmore Doctrine”, the courts 
have generally based their reasoning on the Civil Code and the applica-
ble rights guaranteed by the Quebec Charter, given the nature of the 
                                                                                                             
60  Jean-Claude Royer & Sophie Lavallée, La preuve civile, 4th ed. (Cowansville, Que., 
Yvon Blais, 2008) at 73 [hereinafter “La preuve civile”]. 
61  Id., at 74 (translation) (emphasis added). 
62  Id., at 1042. 
63  Id., at 1043 (translation). 
64  Lac d’Amiante, supra, note 43, at para. 39 (translation). 
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case.65 Although refusing to turn to the “Wigmore Doctrine” to support 
their analysis, Quebec courts are not diametrically opposed to recogniz-
ing a journalist-source privilege, as witnessed by this extract of Biron J.’s 
reasons in Jacques Drouin v. La Presse: 
In short, although the information sought may be interesting, it is not 
necessary to maintain the fairness of the trial. It appears, in the final 
analysis, that only freedom of the press would lose, without the 
Plaintiff gaining anything. Our legal system is based on the search for 
the truth but it should not be overly curious.66 
Quebec courts have therefore dismissed an application for the disclosure 
of a reporter’s source a few times, without referring to the “Wigmore 
Doctrine”. This was the case in Centre de réadaptation en déficience 
intellectuelle de Québec v. Groupe TVA Inc.67 when the Superior Court 
had to determine whether or not it should allow the application of the 
plaintiff, which requested the name of a reporter’s source. During a news 
story, reporter Nicolas Vigneault had questioned the source of reporter 
Pierre Jobin about the plaintiff’s mission to take charge of and socially 
integrate approximately 100 people who were still at the public estab-
lishment due to mental impairment. Rather than use the “Wigmore 
Doctrine”, the Court weighed the two fundamental rights of the parties, 
namely, “[f]irstly, freedom of expression which covers freedom of the 
press and the public’s right to information and, secondly, the right of all 
citizens to put forward all their grounds of defence during a hearing 
before an independent court.”68 The Court also held that the plaintiff 
could exercise its right without having to know the identity of the 
source.69 Regarding the consequences of such a decision on the plaintiff 
imposing disciplinary measures on the source, the Court held that it was 
minimal compared to what the reporter Pierre Jobin would suffer if he 
were forced to identify his source. Such an order could irrevocably affect 
Mr. Jobin’s ability to obtain information from a confidential source in  
the future.70 
                                                                                                             
65  See in particular, Grenier v. Arthur, [2001] J.Q. no 1170, [2001] R.J.Q. 674 (Que. S.C.); 
Centre de réadaptation en déficience intellectuelle de Québec v. Groupe TVA inc., [2005] J.Q. no 
9932, [2005] R.J.Q. 2327, and Jacques Drouin v. La Presse ltée, [1999] J.Q. no 6398, [1999] R.J.Q. 
3023 (Que. S.C.). 
66  Jacques Drouin v. La Presse Ltée, id., at 3030. 
67  [2005] J.Q. no 9932, [2005] R.J.Q. 2327 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter “C.R.D.I.Q. v. Groupe 
TVA”]. 
68  Id., at para. 113 (translation). 
69  Id., at para. 114. 
70  Id., at paras. 115-116. 
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In Tremblay v. Hamilton,71 the Superior Court applied the “Wigmore 
Doctrine” and recognized a privilege by assessing the particular circum-
stances of the situation. The Court also noted that  
the particular role of the press, the importance of freedom of the press 
guaranteed in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as well as the requirement set out in Article 2858 of the Civil 
Code of Québec should be weighed with a view to the other party’s 
right to obtain the disclosure it is seeking by taking legal action.72 
It took 16 years for the Supreme Court’s decision in Globe and Mail 
to put an end to the doctrinal and jurisprudential debate regarding the 
recognition of a journalist-source privilege in Quebec civil law. 
V. THE MATTER OF GLOBE AND MAIL  
1. The Facts 
After the results of the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the 
federal cabinet created the Sponsorship Program to counter the sover-
eignty movement and increase the federal government’s visibility in 
Quebec. Based mainly on information received from a confidential 
source, journalist Daniel Leblanc from The Globe and Mail (“the 
Globe”) wrote a series of articles on the program. These articles reported 
various dubious activities surrounding the program’s administration and 
management. His most significant allegations targeted the misuse and 
misdirection of public funds. Throughout the course of his communica-
tions with his source, whom he later identified as “MaChouette”, Daniel 
Leblanc agreed to protect her confidentiality and anonymity. 
The articles published by Daniel Leblanc and others who picked up 
the story drummed up considerable media and public interest in the 
Sponsorship Program. A scathing report from the Auditor General on the 
federal government’s dubious management of the Sponsorship Program 
as well as the “leaks” of privileged information to the press forced Paul 
Martin, who was then Prime Minister, to order a commission of inquiry 
into the Sponsorship Program, the highly publicized Gomery Inquiry, to 
shed light on what had become known colloquially as the “Sponsorship 
                                                                                                             
71  [1995] J.Q. no 2949, [1995] R.J.Q. 2440 (Que. S.C.). See also Landry v. Southam Inc., 
[2002] J.Q. no 9194 (Que. S.C.). 
72  Tremblay v. Hamilton, id., at 2444 (translation).  
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Scandal”. In 2006, Daniel Leblanc published a work entitled Nom de 
code : MaChouette. L’enquête sur le scandale des commandites.73 
In March 2005, the Attorney General of Canada brought proceedings 
before the Superior Court of Quebec against several companies, includ-
ing Groupe Polygone Éditeurs Inc., in order to recover the over $60 
million that had been paid by the federal government under the contested 
program. 
The defendant Groupe Polygone advanced, among other things, a 
defence of prescription to have the Attorney General’s claim dismissed, 
alleging that the Canadian government knew of the scandal before 2002. 
It argued that the action brought by the Attorney General of Canada was 
statute-barred. At trial, and in support of its defence of prescription, 
Groupe Polygone requested the court to order certain people, specifically 
several employees of the federal government, to answer questions aimed 
at identifying Daniel Lablanc’s secret source. In a series of orders, the 
Superior Court instructed the individuals identified by Groupe Polygone 
to answer the questions in writing and to keep the matter confidential. 
When it received news of these orders, the Globe filed a motion for 
revocation of the orders issued by the court along with a sworn statement 
of the journalist maintaining that the orders violated Daniel Leblanc’s 
and the Globe’s freedom of expression, which encompasses journalist-
source privilege. Before the Superior Court, Daniel Leblanc testified that 
the identity of his source, MaChouette, was confidential, and that a 
relationship of trust based on anonymity had developed between them 
over time. During the cross-examination led by Polygone’s attorney, the 
Globe’s counsel raised objections to the many questions asked of Daniel 
Leblanc, alleging that the questions were irrelevant and that answering 
them would constitute a breach of the journalist-source privilege. The 
trial judge dismissed these objections orally without any in-depth 
analysis and refused to recognize the existence of the privilege. 
Leave to appeal this decision was dismissed by a single judge of the 
Court of Appeal on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction. Rather 
than have its reporter answer the questions, the Globe tried to discontinue 
its motion for revocation, but the trial judge refused and the Quebec 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of this decision. The Globe finally 
appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision before the Supreme Court  
of Canada. 
                                                                                                             
73  (Montreal: Libre Expression, 2006). 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)   JOURNALIST SOURCE PRIVILEGE IN QUEBEC CIVIL LAW 293 
2. Allegations of the Parties 
For the sake of this discussion, we provide the reader with a short 
summary of the allegations of the main parties and interveners in Globe 
and Mail: the Globe, Groupe Polygone, the Attorney General of Canada, 
the Québec Federation of Professional Journalists and the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association. 
(a) The Globe and Mail 
Relying on foreign case law acknowledging a journalist-source privi-
lege built over the foundations of constitutional protection afforded to 
freedom of expression and its corollary, freedom of the press, the 
appellant the Globe argued before the Supreme Court that a journalist-
source privilege exists in Quebec law. It argued that there can be no 
freedom of the press unless the confidentiality of journalists’ sources 
receives maximum protection. Indeed, without the assurance of such a 
protection, gathering controversial information that is already difficult to 
access would become virtually impossible; the fear of being unmasked 
and exposed to sanctions would discourage secret sources from disclos-
ing certain information to journalists, thus creating a chilling effect. As 
can be seen from a number of scandals revealed by investigative journal-
ism in the United States, Europe and Canada, the disclosure of public 
interest information to journalists by secret sources is crucial to safe-
guarding the press’s ability to gather information and, consequently, the 
public’s right to access information. 
According to the Globe, the right not to disclose the identity of a se-
cret source stems from section 3 of the Quebec Charter in that it is a 
corollary of the freedom of expression, but is not a full blanket protec-
tion. As is the case with any constitutional or quasi-constitutional 
protection, it must be assessed and weighed to ensure that it is exercised 
with “a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general 
well-being of the citizens of Quebec”, as stipulated in section 9.1. of the 
Quebec Charter. 
The Globe argued that nothing prevents Quebec courts from apply-
ing the “Wigmore Doctrine”. Although it agreed with the general 
principle of the autonomy of the civil law system, the rules of evidence 
in Quebec reflect the mixed sources of Quebec civil law, which is greatly 
influenced by principles inherited from the common law system. 
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(b) Groupe Polygone 
The respondent Groupe Polygone argued that there is no absolute 
privilege in cases of communications between journalists and secret 
sources. 
First, the Constitution does not recognize any journalistic privilege. 
The fundamental principles holding that no one is above the law and that 
anyone can be compelled to disclose relevant information for the 
purposes of justice are two arguments against recognizing a general 
privilege. Testimonial immunity is the exception. The constitutional 
principle of freedom of the press can, however, help the court strike a 
balance among the interests at stake when determining if testimonial 
immunity should apply to a particular case where protection of a source’s 
confidentiality is invoked. 
Polygone also maintained that the courts should use the “Wigmore 
Doctrine” or a similar civil law test, specifying that it is up to the 
journalist to show why protecting the source’s identity outweighs the 
quest for truth.  
According to Polygone, unless the journalist revealed the identity of 
his or her source, it would be unable to present a full defence against the 
government’s action. 
(c)  Attorney General of Canada 
The respondent the Attorney General of Canada contended that the 
issue in dispute must be resolved based solely on the rules of Quebec 
civil law. It is the Civil Code that is the “jus commune” of Quebec and 
governs, in harmony with the Quebec Charter, relations between indi-
viduals. This is why the Attorney General rejected the application of the 
“Wigmore Doctrine” by the Quebec courts.  
The Attorney General did not take a position on the final outcome of 
the appeal, proposing instead an analysis of the civil law principles 
applicable in Quebec respecting the privilege of excluding media 
evidence. 
At the very heart of the Attorney General’s presentation lies the ar-
gument that there is no hierarchy between freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press, the right to an impartial hearing, the right to 
privacy and the administration of justice. These rights are protected by 
the Quebec Charter. The Attorney General of Canada maintained that 
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such a right can only be recognized on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to 
section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter.74 
The Attorney General of Canada noted that, in Quebec civil matters, 
the question of whether or not a journalist-source privilege exists 
generally arises in defamation suits and can be resolved. The courts 
generally try to strike a balance between freedom of the press and the 
right of those being tried to obtain disclosure of evidence crucial to their 
case. The Attorney General of Canada pointed out that the solution 
adopted must take into consideration the ultimate purpose of a civil 
action, namely, the quest for truth.  
The Media Coalition75 argued that the Canadian Charter and the 
Quebec Charter both protect freedom of the press through freedom of 
expression. Case law has also recognized that the right to freely gather 
information without undue restriction is a corollary of the freedom of the 
press and is fundamental to news publishing.76 To preserve the vitality of 
investigative journalism, journalists must be able to guarantee the 
confidentiality of their sources so that they may gather the information 
needed to publish news stories. Refusing to recognize this privilege 
under these circumstances would have a disastrous effect on the vitality 
of the press and, as a result, on democracy itself. 
The Media Coalition also argued that the Canadian Charter and the 
Quebec Charter applied to the case. In fact, it is not only the rights of the 
journalist and parties involved in the dispute that are at issue here, but 
freedom of expression and the public’s right to information.  
Moreover, when the Canadian government itself is a party to the dis-
pute and is directly involved in the examination of a journalist who is 
being asked to reveal his or her source, such implication of governmental 
authorities justifies in and of itself the application of the Canadian 
Charter. 
                                                                                                             
74  Quebec Charter, s. 9.1 provides: 
In exercising his fundemental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper re-
gard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of 
Québec.  
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limit to their exercise, may be 
fixed by law. 
75  The Media Coalition consisted of: The Quebec Federation of Professional Journalists, Ad 
IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Astral Media Radio Inc., Groupe TVA inc., La Presse, 
ltée, Médias Transcontinental Inc. and, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Christian Leblanc acted 
as counsel for the Media Coalition in Globe and Mail. 
76  Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 SC.R. 421 
(S.C.C.). 
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The Media Coalition further argued that the “Wigmore Doctrine” is 
not incompatible with Quebec law and must lead the case-by-case 
analysis of the issue in dispute, under both the Canadian Charter and the 
Quebec Charter. Hence, the suppletive role of common law in Quebec 
civil law, and the application of the “Wigmore Doctrine”, has been 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Media Coalition also 
pleaded that the Court has the power to create an independent privilege, 
as was the case with the assertion of the police-informer privilege in 
Quebec.  
Furthermore, the Media Coalition contended that the “Wigmore Doc-
trine” should be amended by integrating the Dagenais/Mentuck test,77 
which is used to determine whether a court should exercise its discre-
tionary power to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the press 
in judicial proceedings. The Dagenais/Mentuck test, which is mechani-
cally similar to the Oakes test,78 is a two-prong test and provides that a 
publication ban may only be issued: (1) where it is necessary to prevent a 
serious risk to the proper administration of justice, because reasonable 
alternative measures will not prevent that risk; and (2) when the salutary 
effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the 
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on 
the right to freedom of expression, the right of the accused to a fair and 
public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice. 
In this case, the Media Coalition showed that the first three factors of 
the “Wigmore Doctrine”, adapted to the context of journalism, were met. 
Consequently, communications between Leblanc and MaChouette were 
transmitted confidentially with the assurance that MaChouette’s identity 
would not be disclosed; the anonymity of this source is essential to the 
preservation of the relationship; and the relationship between the 
journalist and his source MaChouette was sedulously fostered. Under the 
fourth factor of the Wigmore Doctrine, the Media Coalition argued that 
Polygone must demonstrate that the necessity and benefit of disclosing 
the source outweigh the deleterious effects on the right to freedom of 
expression and the public’s right to information. The Globe’s objection to 
the questions asked of the journalist Daniel Leblanc should therefore 
have been sustained. 
                                                                                                             
77  R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at para. 32, 
(S.C.C.). 
78  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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(d) Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”) 
Along with the Media Coalition, the CCLA argued that the right to 
freely gather information is part of freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press, and that confidential sources are an essential newsgathering 
tool. The CCLA did not address the particular issue of the Quebec civil 
law culture, however, pointing out that the Supreme Court of Canada 
should adopt a uniform approach to journalist-source privilege. 
According to the CCLA, a court order that would compel the disclo-
sure of a confidential source violates section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter and must be justified under section 1; in Quebec, such an order 
violates section 3 of the Quebec Charter and must be justified under 
section 9.1. 
The CCLA argued that since the Wigmore test was not intended to 
protect constitutional entitlements, it cannot safeguard Charter rights. 
According to the CCLA, the Wigmore test is inadequate to protect 
Charter rights, and therefore could not be used to determine whether or 
not a judge should order the disclosure of a confidential source. The 
CCLA therefore proposed a two-step test: 
Step one: To establish a prima facie privilege the claimant must show 
that (a) he or she is a journalist, (b) who is engaged in newsgathering, 
and (c) acquired information in exchange for a promise of 
confidentiality, and 
Step two: Once a privilege is established, the burden shifts, and the 
party seeking disclosure of a confidential newsgathering source must 
justify the violation of a journalist-source privilege under the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test.79 
The CCLA’s test originates in the approach the association first pre-
sented to the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. National Post. The CCLA 
argued that the proposed test should replace the common law Wigmore 
test, and apply whenever a judge is asked to compel disclosure of a 
confidential source. 
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3. Reasons for Judgment 
Picking up where it had left off in R. v. National Post,80 the Supreme 
Court of Canada, led by LeBel J., concluded that journalistic sources are 
protected in Quebec under civil law, and developed a clear test to 
determine whether or not journalists are required to reveal the identity of 
a secret source in disputes before a civil court. 
(a) Legal Underpinnings of the Journalist-Source Privilege 
First, the Supreme Court of Canada specified that the Quebec Char-
ter applies in this dispute. Based on an analysis it had developed to assess 
whether or not a journalist-source privilege exists and may apply in the 
context of adducing documents or other physical evidence in a criminal 
investigation process in a common law province, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there is no quasi-constitutional basis for recognizing a 
journalist-source privilege.81  
As for the possibility of finding a quasi-constitutional basis under 
section 3 of the Quebec Charter, the Supreme Court examined the similar 
wording of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter in R. v. National Post, 
namely, use of the words “every person” much in the same way as 
“everyone”. It is precisely because defining the group that would be 
protected by quasi-constitutional immunity is so difficult (due, among 
other reasons, to the heterogeneous nature of the group) that the Court 
refuses to recognize a generic and quasi-constitutional privilege protect-
ing the secrecy of journalists’ sources. The Court specified, however, that 
the constitutional rights and values guaranteed under the Canadian 
Charter and the quasi-constitutional rights guaranteed under the Quebec 
Charter are engaged by claims of journalist-source privilege and must 
therefore be considered in the analysis.82 
As for the possibility of broadening the notion of professional se-
crecy to include communications between journalists and their secret 
sources, the Court concluded that there is no basis for drawing an 
analogy between professional secrecy and journalist-source privilege. In 
fact, not only does section 9 of the Quebec Charter apply to the profes-
sions governed by the Professional Code, to which the profession of 
journalism is not subject, the relationship between journalists and their 
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secret sources is not the type of relationship conceivably contemplated 
by section 9 of the Quebec Charter.83 Indeed, Quebec doctrine identifies 
two conditions that are crucial for recognizing relationships bound by 
professional secrecy: (1) professions governed by the Professional Code; 
and (2) an obligation of silence that is rooted in a relationship where the 
beneficiary of the privilege seeks out the professional for help.84 The 
Supreme Court concluded that the relationship between journalists and 
their secret sources is not a helping relationship. 
As to the possibility of section 44 of the Quebec Charter being a 
source of a quasi-constitutional right, the Court believed that, while it is 
true that the right to information favours the protection of confidential 
relations between journalists and their sources, it cannot constitute the 
basis for recognizing journalist-source privilege.85 Indeed, this privilege 
is not a fundamental right, but belongs to a class of social and economic 
rights.86  
Since the Court concluded that a journalist-source privilege does not 
exist under the Quebec Charter, it turned to the Quebec rules of proce-
dural and evidentiary law set forth in the Civil Code and the C.C.P. in 
order to determine whether it contained a basis for recognizing this right. 
(b) Quebec, a Mixed Jurisdiction  
Before beginning its analysis of testimonial privilege under Quebec 
civil law, the Court first looked at the mixed sources of Quebec’s 
procedural law. Globe and Mail thus gave the Supreme Court of Canada 
an additional opportunity to recognize the mixed nature of Quebec civil 
law, in this particular case, evidentiary law. In light of the mixed nature 
of procedure and evidence in Quebec, and especially since the judiciary 
system was greatly inspired by common law, the legal principles of 
common law naturally play a suppletive role in the evolution of Quebec 
procedural law. In the words of the Court, “Québec is, after all, a mixed 
jurisdiction.”87 
After discussing Lac d’Amiante,88 the Court emphasized that Quebec 
courts do not enjoy the same freedom as their neighbouring common law 
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provinces when it comes to ruling above and beyond the written codes 
and legislation when they need to fill certain gaps or resolve certain 
controversies.89 With regard to excluding evidence, Civil Code arti-
cle 2858 is the only provision on which the discretionary power of a 
judge may be based, and even then it is a discretion which remains 
limited: 
The court shall, even of its own motion, reject any evidence obtained 
under such circumstances that fundamental rights and freedoms are 
breached and that its use would tend to bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
The latter criterion is not taken into account in the case of violation of 
the right of professional privilege. 
The Court, having already concluded that a journalist-source privilege is 
not quasi-constitutional, concluded at this stage of the analysis that a 
judge cannot exempt a journalist from testifying as to the identity of a 
confidential source under this discretionary power.90 Aware of the 
doctrinal and case law controversy surrounding the application of the 
“Wigmore Doctrine” by Quebec courts, the Supreme Court insisted on 
the residual role played by common law rules in the development of 
evidentiary law.91 Given that a journalist-source privilege exists in 
common law provinces, as confirmed by R. v. National Post, the Court 
explained why the common law could play a role in clarifying Quebec 
law on this issue.92 After stating that a mechanical incorporation of a 
common law rule or principle should be avoided, the Court made clear 
that any reliance on this law must comply with the overarching principles 
set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter.93 Justice LeBel 
repeated that not everything on civil procedure is found in the C.C.P., 
leaving room for rules of practice. The Code of Civil Procedure, contin-
ued the Court, also allows tribunals to intervene on a case-by-case basis, 
and confers the power to issue orders adapted to the particular context of 
the cases of which they are apprised, specifically under articles 20 and 46 
of the C.C.P. 
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The Court thus confirmed that there is a basis in Quebec civil law for 
recognizing a journalist-source privilege or an exemption from the 
general obligation to give evidence in civil cases. The application of the 
“Wigmore Doctrine” by Quebec courts in compliance with the overarch-
ing principles set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter provides 
an analytical framework for recognizing, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether it is expedient to exempt journalists from answering questions 
that would force them to disclose the identity of their sources. 
(c) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” to the Journalist-Source 
Privilege in Quebec Law 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in this case is consistent 
with Bisaillon v. Keable’s94 decision on the police-informer privilege 
under Quebec law. In the Court’s opinion, this would be the best ap-
proach to adopt for journalists’ sources, given the similarity between the 
outcomes of both measures. In Bisaillon v. Keable, the Supreme Court 
ruled that because the origin of police-informer privilege is the common 
law, the rule remained a part of Quebec law unless it was overturned by a 
validly adopted statutory provision: 
Unless overturned by validly adopted statutory provisions, these 
common law rules must be applied in an inquiry into the administration 
of justice, which is thus a matter of public law. Moreover, the point at 
issue concerns the power to compel a witness to answer, by contempt 
of court proceedings if necessary, the source for which is also the 
common law.95 
Therefore, in the absence of any rule to the contrary in the Civil Code or 
C.C.P., Quebec courts are entirely justified in applying common law 
rules.  
Drawing inspiration from Beetz J.’s reasons in Bisaillon v. Keable 
and taking R. v. National Post into account, the Court proposed a four-
pronged analytical framework (inspired by the “Wigmore Doctrine”) for 
recognizing a journalist-source privilege or an exemption from the 
general obligation to provide evidence or testify in civil cases. To borrow 
the words of LeBel J., “[d]espite its common law origins, the use of a 
Wigmore-like framework to recognize the existence of case-by-case 
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privilege in the criminal law context is equally relevant for civil litigation 
matters subject to the laws of Québec.”96 
Even if section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and section 3 of the 
Quebec Charter alone cannot be used as grounds for recognizing a 
journalist-source privilege, it goes without saying that the values they 
convey necessarily inform the analysis.97 The Court also mentioned the 
powers granted to the Superior Court under article 46 of the C.C.P., 
which appears to provide judges with the authority needed to issue such 
exemptions to journalists on a case-by-case basis.98 Consequently, the 
Wigmore-like framework is not divorced from the rules of Quebec civil 
law; quite the contrary, it reflects the rules’ principles and essence. 
Before applying the four-pronged analytical framework to compel 
journalists to answer questions likely to reveal the identity of a confiden-
tial source, the party seeking to reveal the identity of the source must first 
demonstrate the relevance of the questions. The goal of this condition is 
to ensure compliance with the evidentiary rules in Quebec civil law, 
more specifically article 2857 of the Civil Code, which provides that 
“[a]ll evidence of any fact relevant to a dispute is admissible and may be 
presented by any means.” If relevance is not demonstrated, the analytical 
framework need not be applied since the questions obviously will not be 
allowed. 
If the questions are deemed relevant, the four following factors are 
applied: 
(1)  the relationship must originate in a confidence that the source’s 
identity will not be disclosed; 
(2)  anonymity must be essential to the relationship in which the 
communication arises; 
(3)  the relationship must be one that should be sedulously fostered in 
the public interest; and 
(4)  the public interest served by protecting the identity of the informant 
must outweigh the public interest in getting at the truth.99 
The fourth factor of the analysis is the most important one, since the 
court is called upon to strike a balance between (1) the importance of the 
disclosure to the administration of justice; and (2) the public interest in 
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preserving the confidentiality of the journalist’s source.100 The court must 
weigh a certain number of elements, the list of which is not exhaustive, 
before drawing its conclusion; these factors include what procedural 
stage the case is at (examination in chief or discovery) and whether or 
not the question is essential in the context of the dispute between the 
parties (whether or not the journalist is part of the case).101 This exercise 
of balancing the interests at hand requires the court to determine whether 
the facts, information or evidence can be obtained by other means. 
According to the Court: 
If relevant information is available by other means and, therefore, could 
be obtained without requiring a journalist to break the undertaking of 
confidentiality, then those avenues ought to be exhausted. The 
necessity requirement, like the earlier threshold requirement of 
relevancy, acts as a further buffer against fishing expeditions and any 
unnecessary interference with the work of the media. Requiring a 
journalist to breach a confidentiality undertaking with a source should 
be done only as a last resort.102 
The analysis is thus carried out based on context, since what needs to 
be determined is whether the journalist-source privilege should be 
recognized in a particular case; the privilege is not generic. The court 
will therefore evaluate the relevant elements of a situation as it presents 
itself. It is up to the party invoking the privilege to demonstrate that the 
interest of preserving the confidentiality of the journalist’s source 
outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. 
The Court concluded its analysis with the following: 
For example, at the far end of the spectrum, if Mr. Leblanc’s answers 
were almost certain to identify MaChouette then, bearing in mind the 
high societal interest in investigative journalism, it might be that he 
could only be compelled to speak if his response was vital to the 
integrity of the administration of justice.103 
In our view, in light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court has established 
a highly stringent criterion, precisely that it is only when it is “vital” to 
the “integrity of the administration of justice” that a court will order a 
journalist to answer a question that will entail the disclosure of the 
identity of his or her source. 
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(d) What about MaChouette? 
Once again, here is a brief look at the context in which The Globe and 
Mail invoked journalist-source privilege. Having been informed of the 
orders issued by Hébert J. instructing the individuals identified by Groupe 
Polygone Éditeurs Inc. to answer questions aimed at identifying Daniel 
Leblanc’s secret source, The Globe and Mail presented a motion to revoke 
the orders, arguing that the orders violated journalist-source privilege and 
infringed the freedom of expression of Leblanc and The Globe and Mail. 
During Groupe Polygone’s cross-examination, The Globe and Mail’s 
lawyer objected to numerous questions on grounds that they were irrele-
vant and would breach journalist-source privilege. The trial judge dis-
missed these objections orally (without performing a complete analysis) 
and refused to recognize the existence of that privilege. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge committed an error 
by reaching a hasty conclusion, orally at that, without weighing whether 
that disclosure would be in the public interest. It held that Leblanc was 
entitled to have the questions put to him challenged for relevancy.104 The 
trial judge should have taken his claim seriously and performed the four-
pronged analysis, based on the Wigmore Doctrine as proposed earlier, to 
determine whether or not there was a journalist-source privilege in this 
case.105 In the Court’s opinion: 
if Grandpré J. concluded that the first three factors favoured disclosure, 
he was then required to ask whether, on balance, the public interest in 
maintaining journalist-source confidentiality outweighed the importance 
of disclosure to the administration of justice.106  
In this case, since the parties were not authorized to make comments or 
adduce evidence on the issue of journalist-source privilege before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the latter chose to refer the matter to the 
Superior Court for a new hearing as to whether the questions should be 
put to the journalist Daniel Leblanc, in light of the four-pronged analyti-
cal framework developed by the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                             
104  Id., at para. 68. 
105  Id. 
106  Id., at para. 69. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)   JOURNALIST SOURCE PRIVILEGE IN QUEBEC CIVIL LAW 305 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Globe and Mail involves civil litigation, not the criminal investiga-
tive process. It involves testimonial compulsion, and not the production 
of documents or other physical evidence. The parties’ dispute is subject 
to the laws of Quebec. These elements make the case distinct from R. v. 
National Post. However, in Globe and Mail, the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognized that a journalist-source privilege exists under Quebec 
civil law, putting an end to the controversy over whether the Wigmore 
Doctrine can be applied under Quebec civil law. It thus completes the 
analysis that began in R. v. National Post, in which the court recognized 
a journalist-source privilege in the context of criminal proceedings 
before a common law court. Globe and Mail therefore stands out as a 
milestone Supreme Court of Canada decision that comes as a relief to the 
media community across Canada, clarifying the protection of journalists’ 
sources, and providing investigative journalism with tools to properly 
accomplish its goal. 
The Supreme Court concluded that neither the Civil Code nor the 
C.C.P. explicitly recognize a journalist-source privilege. Nor does the 
Quebec Charter. Even so, the constitutional rights guaranteed under the 
Canadian Charter and the quasi-constitutional rights guaranteed under 
the Quebec Charter are engaged by a claim of journalist-source privilege. 
That said, the Supreme Court strongly emphasized that the identity 
of a confidential journalistic source may only be revealed “if his re-
sponse was vital to the integrity of the administration of justice”.107 
Quebec’s rules of procedure and evidence reflect the mixed sources 
of Quebec civil law. Its procedural and evidentiary rules do not give 
Quebec tribunals a discretionary power equal to that of the common law 
tribunals in the rest of Canada when it comes to filling the existing gaps 
in the law. When confronted with gaps in Quebec’s codified laws, it is 
entirely appropriate that Quebec tribunals turn to common law rules, 
which are one of the legal sources of Quebec civil law. If they believe 
that transplanting a common law rule into Quebec civil law is warranted, 
the courts must still respect the fundamental principle that the interpreta-
tion and articulation of such a rule would not otherwise be contrary to the 
overarching principles set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter. 
In addition, the common law appears to recognize a journalist-source 
privilege based on a Wigmore-like framework. 
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The Supreme Court concluded that there is a foundation in Quebec 
civil law supporting the recognition of a journalist-source privilege or an 
exemption from the general obligation to provide evidence or testify in a 
civil case. The application of the Wigmore Doctrine by Quebec courts, in 
compliance with the overarching principles of the Civil Code and the 
Quebec Charter, provides an analytical framework for determining 
whether it is expedient, in a given case, to exempt journalists from 
answering a question that would force them to identify their sources. 
In Globe and Mail, the Supreme Court of Canada developed a clear 
analytical framework for recognizing a journalist-source privilege on a 
case-by-case basis. To compel journalists to answer questions likely to 
reveal the identity of a confidential source, the courts must perform the 
four-pronged analysis developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Globe and Mail, inspired by the “Wigmore Doctrine”. Once it is found 
that the questions are relevant, journalists must answer whether: (1) the 
relationship originated in a confidence that the source’s identity would 
not be disclosed; (2) anonymity was essential to the relationship in which 
the communication arose; (3) the relationship was one that was sedu-
lously fostered in the public interest; and (4) the public interest that 
would be served by protecting the identity of the informant outweighed 
the public interest in getting at the truth. 
By recognizing the existence of a journalist-source privilege under 
Quebec civil law, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the central role 
that investigative journalism plays in preserving a free and democratic 
society. The confidentiality of journalists’ sources is a crucial factor 
allowing journalists to obtain unfettered public interest information and 
to continue to play a key role in monitoring public and democratic 
institutions. 
